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This study finds a very small effect of micro-credit on income and consumption of the 
borrowers in the short-term. Although the effect estimates on poverty and inequality are 
negative, they are very small and not statistically significant. This might be because 
both income and credit in these survey are defined for the past 12 months. Micro-credit 
tends to be used in production and investment, which often require long period to be 
effective in increasing income and expenditure. Meanwhile, although informal credit 
has negative and not statistically significant impact on per capita income, it has positive 
and statistically significant impact on per capita expenditure. As a result, informal credit 
helps borrowers reduce expenditure poverty. Due the informal credit, the poverty 
incidence of the borrowers was reduced by around 1.6 and 1.4 percentage points in 2004 
and 2006, respectively.  
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1. Introduction  
Micro-finance is seen as an important tool for reaching the Millennium Development 
Goal of halving the proportion of poor people between 1990 and 2015. Micro-credit and 
other financial services would enable the poor to build assets, increase incomes, and 
reduce their vulnerability to economic stress. Credit markets are severely rationed for 
poor households. Commercial banks are not interested in poor clients because of 
information problems and lack of collateral (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Nagarajan, Meyer, 
and Hushak, 1995; Kochar, 1997; Bell, Srinivasan, and Udry, 1997; Bose, 1998; 
Boucher, Carter, and Guirkinger, 2008). The poor do borrow from informal sources 
such as moneylenders, neighbours, relatives and local traders, but their resources are 
supposedly limited and, if charged, interest rates are mostly very high. Governments 
and NGOs have stepped into the gap and have provided credit to the poor, often at 
highly subsidized interest rates.  
While there is intuitive appeal of providing cheap funds to the poor, these 
subsidies have been severely criticised. Subsidized banks and programs would push out 
informal credit suppliers on which the poor rely.  They would also break down the 
rationing mechanism of the interest rate and cause credit to be allocated on the basis of 
politics or social concerns instead of productivity. Moreover, a steady inflow of money 
into financial institutions would decrease the incentives to collect savings deposits, 
leaving poor households with unattractive and inefficient ways to save. Critics of 
subsidized banks therefore argue that the poor would often have been better of without 
the subsidies (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005).  
 Given the wide popularity of microfinance, resulting in a large allocation of 
development funds, and the controversy about an essential element such as the level of 
the interest rate charged, it is important to evaluate the impact of ongoing programs. 
Yet, while there is ample anecdotic evidence consisting of individual success stories 
and, to a smaller extent, accounts of people who went bankrupt, the number of thorough 
quantitative evaluations is surprisingly limited. Although inefficient, State Banks in 
India are shown to have increased income for the poor (Burgess and Pande, 2002; 
Binswanger and Khandker, 1995). Similar results have been found for, e.g., Bangladesh 
(Khandker, 1998;2003; Zaman, 2001),  Indonesia (Robinson, 2001), Pakistan 
(Khandker and Faruqee, 2003), and a number of cases presented in the review paper of 
Morduch and Haley (2002). Other studies indicate that credit programs are not always 
effective in improving welfare and reducing poverty. For example, Diagne and Zeller 
(2001) did not find a statistically significant impact of micro-credit programs on 
household income in Malawi. Similarly, Coleman (1999) found only negligible effects 
on household welfare of a micro-credit program in Thailand, and Morduch (1998) 
showed that most of potential effects of micro-credit from the Grameen bank in 
Bangladesh were on vulnerability reduction instead of poverty reduction.  
Not only is the evidence mixed, there is no study yet that has achieved wide 
consensus as to its reliability (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Separating 
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out the causal role of microfinance is extremely difficult. Microfinance programs do not 
lend to random citizens but carefully select areas in which they work and clients to 
whom they lend. Similarly, not all persons in the target group are equally interested in 
taking loans. Borrowers are therefore different from non-borrowers. Unfortunately, not 
all of these differences are easily measured. Borrowers may, for example, have a more 
entrepreneurial spirit and better business connections than non-borrowers. These 
unobserved differences, and not getting access to credit, may explain income and 
investment differences between borrowers and seemingly similar non-borrowers. 
Failing to account for this problem will lead to biased estimates of program impact, and 
the bias can be large. 
Although, governments have launched many subsidized micro-credit programs, 
informal credit remains popular, especially in developing countries (Timberg and Aiyar 
1984; Manig, 1990; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Nagarajan, Meyer, and Hushak, 1995; 
Kochar, 1997; Bell, Srinivasan, and Udry, 1997; Agénor and Montiel, 1999; Conning 
and Udry, 2005; Boucher, Carter, and Guirkinger, 2008). Subsidized micro-credit 
programs do not require collaterals, but they do screen the borrowers by other eligibility 
criteria such poverty status or repayment capacity. As a result, not all the poor 
households can be able to obtain micro-credit, and some of them have to resort to 
informal credit. Like other credit, informal credits are also important for the poor to 
increase capital and mitigate consumption fluctuation. Yet, impact assessments are very 
rare for informal credit. Most of theoretical and empirical studies focus on determinants 
of informal credit and interactions between informal credit and formal credit (e.g., see 
Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Nagarajan, Meyer, and Hushak, 1995; Kochar, 1997; Bell, 
Srinivasan, and Udry, 1997; Bose, 1998; Conning and Udry, 2005; Boucher, Carter, and 
Guirkinger, 2008).   
Vietnam has set poverty reduction as a major goal of development policy. The 
poverty rate decreased remarkably from 29 percent to 16 percent during the period 
2002-2006 (according to Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) in 
2002, 2004, and 2006). The government has maintained an extensive public safety net 
system to support the poor in all dimensionalities of welfare. One of the most important 
antipoverty programs is the provision of credit for the poor. In 2003, the Vietnam Bank 
for Social Policies (VBSP) was established to provide the poor with preferential micro-
credit. The poor can borrow from the bank at low interest rates without collateral. In 
December 2008, the total outstanding loans for the poor households were around VND 
27,400 billion (VBSP, 2008). The total number of poor clients was around 8,100 
thousand during 2003-2008.  
In addition to VBSP, informal credit is also an important source for people in 
Vietnam. In early 1990s, informal credit accounted for more than 70 percent of total 
credit in the rural areas (McCarty,  2001; Pham and Lensink, 2007). The proportion of 
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informal loans tends to decrease overtime because of the growing role of formal credit. 
Using a data sample of four provinces in Vietnam, Barslund and Tarp (2007) found that 
the informal loans accounted for 36 percent of all loans in rural areas in 2003.  
Only a few previous studies have analyzed the quantitative impact of micro-
credit programs and informal credit in Vietnam, and their findings are not consistent. 
Quach and Mullineux (2007) used Vietnam Living Standard Surveys in 1993 and 1998 
to measure impacts of credit from both formal and informal sources. Their study found 
that credit can help increase household expenditure. Nguyen (2008) found that micro-
credit from VBSP had positive impacts on income, consumption and poverty reduction 
of the borrowers in the rural areas using Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys 
in 2002 and 2004. Recently, Pham and Lensink (2008) analyze the effect of micro-
credit programs and formal credits on self-employment profits of rural households using 
VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. Their conclusions are that micro-credit does not have positive 
effects on household self-employment profits, meanwhile credit from commercial banks 
seem to help households increase their self-employment profits.   
The present study adds to the limited existing evidence on the impact of 
microfinance and informal credit by analysing the case of Vietnam We apply fixed-
effect regression using before-after program data from the Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Surveys (VHLSS) to account for the attribution problem described above. 
Based on the regressions, we compute the average effect of the program on income and 
expenditures of participating households and compute the impact of the program on 
poverty and inequality. 
The case of Vietnam is interesting for at least two reasons. First, the Vietnamese 
government has spent huge amounts of money on microfinance: In 2003 it established 
the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) to consolidate the provision of 
preferential micro-credit to the poor. The VBSP reportedly has received VND 1.515 
trillion (US$ 100 million) in charter capital from the state budget and was scheduled to 
receive another VND 3.5 trillion (US$ 230 million). This funding is complemented by 
mandatory contributions of two percent of total VND deposits by the state owned 
commercial banks, which will amount to approximately US$200 million, with rates 
negotiable (World Bank, 2004). Second, nominal interest rates of VBSP are highly 
subsidized at about half the “market” rates charged by most of the other microfinance 
programs (World Bank, 2007). The low and even negative real interest rates may have 
pushed out informal credit suppliers, weakened alternative programs, and/or caused 
high leakage rates to non-poor households.  
The rest of the paper is structured into 5 sections. The second section describes 
data set used in this study. The third section presents poverty and households’ access to 
micro-credit and informal credit. The fourth section presents the estimation method. 
Next, the empirical findings on impact measurement are presented in the fifth section. 
Finally, the sixth section concludes.    
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2. Data sources 
The study relies on data from the two most recent Vietnam Household Living Standard 
Surveys (VHLSS), which were conducted by the General Statistical Office of Vietnam 
(GSO) with technical support from the World Bank (WB) in the years 2004 and 2006. 
The 2004 and 2006 VHLSSs cover 9188 and 9189 households, respectively. The 
samples are representative for the national, rural and urban, and regional levels. The 
2004 and 2006 VHLSSs result in a panel of 4216 households, for which data is 
available for both years. The number of urban and rural households is 1012 and 3204, 
respectively. 
The sample selection of VHLSSs 2004 and 2006 follows a method of stratified 
random cluster sampling. GSO selected households in all rural and urban provinces of 
Vietnam, i.e. rural and urban areas of all provinces are strata. Among each stratum, 
communes were selected randomly as a primary sampling unit. The number of 
communes per stratum is proportionate to the population. The number of selected 
communes in each VHLSS is 3063. In each commune, about 3 households were 
selected randomly.  
The surveys collected information through household and community level 
questionnaires. Information on households includes basic demography, employment and 
labour force participation, education, health, income, expenditure, housing, fixed assets 
and durable goods, participation of households in poverty alleviation programs, and 
especially information on loans that households had obtained or still owed during the 12 
months before the interview. 
Data on expenditure and income were collected using very detailed 
questionnaires. Information on small and detailed expenditure and income categories 
was collected and then aggregated into expenditure and income per capita. Food 
expenditure includes purchased food and foodstuff and self-produced products of 
households. Non-food expenditure comprises expenditures on education, healthcare, 
housing, consumer durables, power, water supply and garbage collection. Household 
income can come from any source. Total income includes income from agricultural and 
non-agricultural production, salary, wage, pension, scholarship, income from loan 
interest and house rental, remittance and subsidies. Income from agricultural production 
comprises crop income, livestock income, aquaculture income, and income from other 
agriculture-related activities.  
Information was also collected on commune characteristics, but only for rural 
areas. In our analysis, we use two commune level variables, namely distance to the 
nearest market and a dummy variable indicating whether the village has a road. Since 
our sample includes the entire country, we had to come up with estimates for the urban 
areas. We assumed that for urban areas, the variables “distance to market” and “have a 
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road” are equal to 0 and 1, respectively.  This is a reasonable assumption given the fact 
that in all cities there is a market and at least one road.  
 
3. The VBSP Program and informal credit 
The VBSP was established in 2003 as an independent public institute for the provision 
of government lending to the poor and other vulnerable groups. The creation of the 
VBSP meant a consolidation of government-lending for the poor, and since 2003 
outreach and outstanding loans have increased continuously (VBSP, 2005). As indicated 
above, the program is highly subsidized. Average monthly interest rates increased from 
0.26 to 0.36 percent during the period 2004-2006, which amounts to about 4 percent on 
a yearly basis. Given that inflation was 7.7 percent over 2004, this implied that the real 
interest rate was minus four percent. For sake of comparison: commercial banks used a 
yearly rate of twelve percent for loans of 6-12 months with collateral. 
The VBSP program is designed as a group-based lending scheme with credit 
disbursed through groups of 5 to 50 members living in a single village. The argument 
for the group-based design is that monitoring of loan payments by group members 
would lead to high repayment rates (e.g., Coleman, 1999). This strategy seems to have 
been successful, as reported default rates are less than two percent (VBSP, 2005).  
To apply for credit, a household first sends a formatted letter to their credit group. 
The credit group will arrange a meeting of all members to consider the relevance of the 
borrowing. They will determine which household can borrow, and credit amount for 
corresponding households. The list of borrowing households will be prepared by the 
credit group and sent to the People Committee in that commune. Once the list has been 
approved by the People Committee, it will be sent to a VBSP branch for loan provision. 
Generally, the VBSP endorses the list sent by the People Committee. Households can 
then receive their loans at a VBSP branch in their locality or the VBSP staff brings the 
loans to the households.    
There are four criteria that a household should officially meet to become a 
member of a credit group. First, the household should have a long-term residence permit 
at the locality in which the group is located. Second, at least one household member 
should be able to work. Third, the household has a sanctioned demand for credit, which 
can officially only be used for income-generating activities, such as production, 
business, and services; the repair of a seriously damaged house; or to cover the 
educational cost for primary and secondary school pupils. Finally, the household should 
be classified as poor by the local authority. The classification procedure is rather 
complicated. Basically, a village committee prepares a list of the poor based on their 
own criteria, which may for example include asset levels, food security, type of 
housing, and school-going of children. The number and nature of the criteria differ 
widely between villages. The preliminary list is submitted to a commune-level 
committee of Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction (HEPR), which conducts an 
income survey for all households on the list. The resulting incomes are compared to the 
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income poverty line of the Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs 
(MOLISA), which was set relatively low at VND 80-100 thousands per capita in rural 
areas for the period 2001-2005, the equivalent of about fifteen to twenty kg of rice. 
Those households with higher per capita income than this poverty line are excluded 
from the list. Finally, the refined list is updated by the village committee and the 
People’s Committee and People’s Council in an iterative procedure (MOLISA, 2003).  
To examine whether the program reached poor households, we classified 
households as poor if their per capita expenditure is below the poverty line as defined 
by GSO and WB and then compared credit use from the VBSP between poor and non-
poor households using the data from VHLSS 2004 and 2006.  The WB-GSO poverty 
line is equivalent to the expenditure level that allows for nutritional needs and some 
essential non-food consumption such as clothing and housing and amounts to VND 
2,077 and 2,560 thousands per capita in 2004 and 2006, respectively.3 Please recall that 
this is not the poverty classification used as an eligibility criterion for credit group 
membership. The criteria for the latter classification are partly commune-specific and 
therefore not consistent throughout the population. Moreover, local power structures 
may have affected the outcomes of the iterative classification process. Yet the overlap 
between the two classifications is quite large: more than seventy percent of those 
classified as poor according to the commune-level classification are also considered 
poor using the GSO-WB poverty line. The reverse cannot said to be true, as poverty 
rates are more than twice as high using the GSO-WB classification. This implies that 
the GSO-WB classification, which we use in the remainder of this paper, includes most 
of the poor according to the commune-level classification, a formal requirement for 
receiving VBSP credit, and many more households.   
The coverage rate of the VBSP was low: only seven percent of all households and 
twelve percent of the poor borrowed from the program in 2004. The share of poor 
people with VBSP loans has increased slightly to fifteen percent in 2006, with the 
overall share remaining almost constant. The average loan size was VND 3,537 
thousand and 4,414 in 2004 and 2006, respectively, which was about 23 percent of 
household income or 1.7 times the per capita poverty line.  
Leakage rates were very high. Only 30 and 28 percent of borrowing households 
was classified as poor in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Moreover, non-poor households 
on average obtained larger loans, such that in both years only 26 percent of outstanding 
credit was allocated to poor households, the official target group of the program. This 
indicates that eligibility criteria were not always upheld. According to Dufhues, et al. 
(2002) credit groups and commune heads were reluctant to include poor households in 
the list of credit applicants as non-poor are expected to be more reliable in using credit 
effectively and repaying loans. Moreover, the negative real interest rates will have 
added pressure to allocate loans to politically favoured residents, rather than the poor. 
                                                     
3 Regional price differences and monthly price changes over the survey period have been taken into 
account when the poverty lines are calculated.  
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Finally, the poor may tend to apply for lower loans than the non-poor, who have higher 
levels of assets and possibly skills.  
There is a tendency of contraction of informal credit. The percentage of 
households borrowing from informal credit was reduced from 20 to 16 during the period 
2004-2006. However, compared to the VBSP credit, informal credit covered a larger 
proportion of both the poor and non-poor. The ratio of the poor and non-poor borrowed 
from the informal sources was 21 and 15 percent in 2006, respectively. The average 
loan size from informal sources was also higher than that from the VBSP. The non-poor 
had much higher average loan size than the poor. In 2006, the loan size per a borrowing 
household is VND 3,977 and 6,372 thousand, respectively. As expected, compared to 
the VBSP credit, the informal credit has much higher interest rate. The monthly interest 
rate of the VBSP and informal credit was 0.3 percent and 0.6 percent in 2006, 
respectively.  
 An interesting question is whether credit from VBSP can replace informal credit. 
Among the borrowers from VBSP, the ratio of households also receiving informal credit 
was 18 percent in 2006. It means that credit from VBSP is not sufficient for households, 
and they have to resort informal credit. Similarly, households who are not able to 
borrow from VBSP also have to find informal sources for credit. In 2006, there were 
around 16 percent of the non-borrowers from VBSP who obtained informal credit.   
One important issue in examining the effectiveness of the credit is the use of 
credit. Although credit can be fungible, we can get some insight how credit is used by 
using households’ information on the use of credit. It shows that a large proportion of 
VBSP credit is used for investment and production capital. In 2006, the poor and non-
poor households used 62 and 43 percent of VBSP loans for agricultural production and 
investment. However, the non-poor spent more credit in non-farm activities. In 2006, 
the poor and non-poor used 2 and 15 percent of the VBSP credit in non-farm production 
and investment. Credit was also used for debt repayment and important needs such as 
house construction, healthcare and education. However the poor households reported 
that 12.4 percent of credit is used for consumption.  
Compared to VBSP credit, a smaller proportion of informal credit was used in 
production and investment. In 2006, the poor and non-poor households used 22 and 10 
percent of informal loans for agricultural production and investment. Regarding the 
non-farm production, the poor and non-poor used around 3 and 18 percent of the 
informal credit. Most of informal loans are used in consumption, especially house 
construction and purchase.  
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4. Evaluation methodology 
4.1. Impact of credit on income and expenditure 
To assess the impact of VBSP and informal credit, we assume welfare can be specified 
as follows: 
ijtjtijtijttijt CDXGY   43210 ,       (1)  
where Y is income per capita or expenditure per capita.  The subscripts i, j and t refer to 
household i in commune j at time t, respectively. Note that “per capita” refers to the 
average per household member at period t. For instance, per capita income is calculated 
as total household income at period t over the number of household members at period t. 
Gt is a year dummy, with a one for 2006; This dummy enables to control for common 
macroeconomic changes between the two years. X and C are vectors of household and 
community level control variables. The vector D covers per capita VBSP credit and 
informal credit (i.e. average loan size per household member at period t).  
The main problem in estimating the equation is the endogeneity of program 
participation. Borrowing can be correlated with unobserved characteristics of 
households, such as motivation for higher income or abilities in business. Failure to 
control for such factors leads to biased estimates of program impact: if it is, for 
example, the better entrepreneurs who take a loan, and we do not directly include 
information on managerial capacity in our regression (because it is not available), a 
significant and positive coefficient for program participation is at least partly caused by 
these capacity differences and not by the program itself.  
In this study, we use the panel nature of the data to avoid endogeneity bias. A 
main assumption of the method used is that unobserved variables that are correlated 
with both outcome and program variables remained unchanged during the period 2004-
2006, which is covered by the panel. We feel that it is reasonable to assume that the 
relevant variables, such as business and production skills or motivation for higher 
income, were time-invariant during such a short period of time.  
The marginal impact of credit is measured by 3 . We will also measure the 
impact of credit by calculating the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) 
(Heckman, et al., 1999). ATT is the expected impact of credit on borrowers (with D>0):  
( 0)( 0) ( 0)t ijt ijt ijt D ijtATT E Y D E Y D    ,       (2) 
Where )0( )0(  ijtDijt DYE  is the expected value of the outcome variable of the borrowers, 
i.e. income per capita and expenditure per capita, had they not received credit. This is 
not observed and has to be estimated.  
Using equation (1), we get 
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where nt is the number of the borrowers at the time t.  
We estimate the standard error of the ATT estimates by using a non-parametric 
bootstrap technique. This bootstrap is implemented by repeatedly drawing samples from 
the original sample of the VHLSS panel data. Since the VHLSSs sample selection 
follows stratified random cluster sampling, communes instead of households are 
bootstrapped in each stratum (Deaton, 1997). In other words, the bootstrap is made of 
communes (i.e., clusters) within strata. The number of replications is 500.4    
 
4.2. The impact of credit on poverty and inequality 
We considered not only the traditional impact indicators described above, but also 
looked directly at the effect of the program on a set of poverty and inequality indicators. 
We measured poverty by three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indexes. To measure 
the inequality, we used three common measures of inequality: the Gini coefficient, 
Theil’s L index of inequality, and Theil’s T index of inequality. For all measures, we 
used per capita expenditures as welfare indicator. 
The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indexes can all be calculated using the 

















 ,                                                                                     (4)  
where z is the poverty line, n is the number of people in the sample population, q is the 
number of poor people, and Yi is per capita expenditures for person i.  can be 
interpreted as a measure of inequality aversion. When  = 0, we have the headcount 
index H which measures the proportion of people below the poverty line. When  = 1 
and  = 2, we have the poverty gap PG, which measures the depth of poverty, and the 
squared poverty gap P2, which measures the severity of poverty, respectively. 
The Gini coefficient can be calculated from the individual expenditures in the 
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4 In order to examine the robustness of our bootstrap technique, we also tried to bootstrap households. 
The results were similar. 
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The value of the Gini coefficient varies from 0 when everyone has the same 
expenditures to 1 when one person has everything. Hence, the closer a Gini coefficient 
is to one, the more unequal is the distribution.  



















_ ,           (6) 
where Y  is the average per capita expenditure. The Theil L index ranges from 0 to 
infinity, and the higher is the value of Theil L, the higher is inequality. 





















_           (7) 
The Theil T index ranges from 0 (lowest inequality) to ln(N) (highest inequality).  
The impact of the program on poverty index for participants is expressed as 
follows: 
),1(),1( 01 YDPYDPP  ,          (8) 
where the first term in the right-hand side of (8) is the measure of poverty in the 
presence of the VBSP program. This term is observed and can be estimated directly 
from the sample data. However, the second term in the right-hand side of (8) is the 
counterfactual measure of poverty, i.e., poverty indexes of the credit recipients had they 
not received the credit. This term is not observed directly, and it is estimated.  
 Regarding inequality, we measure the impact of the program on reduction of 
inequality of the whole population. If the program increases expenditure for the poor 
more than for the rich, it will decrease inequality. If, on the other hand, the high leakage 
rate results in higher benefits for the rich, the program will increase inequality. The 
impact on an inequality index is expressed: 
)()( 0YIYII  ,            (9) 
where I(Y) is the observed inequality based on the observed outcome, and I(Y0) is the 
estimated inequality in the absence of a program.  
 
5. Credit impact 
5.1. Program impact on household income and expenditure 
To estimate the effects of VBSP and informal credit on per capita income and per capita 
expenditure, we regress per capita income and per capita expenditure on per capita 
VBSP credit and per capita informal credit and other control variables. Control 
variables include household composition, education of household members, land and 
housing, villages, urbanity, and regional variables. It should be noted that we use two 
 12 
village level variables, distance to the nearest market, and a dummy variable indicating 
whether the village has a road. The VHLSS data sets only provider information on these 
variables for the rural area.5  
The list of the variables and summary statistics for the borrowing and non-
borrowing households are presented in Table A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. In order to 
control for inflation, we have deflated all variables in terms of 2004 prices. Tables A.3 
and A.4 present the regression results. We present both random effects and fixed effects 
estimates, without and with sampling weight and cluster correlation.  Since the 
Hausman tests strongly favor the fixed effects estimates we focus the discussion on the 
fixed effects estimates.  
Table A.3 shows that both VBSP and informal credit do not have statistically 
significant impacts on per capita income. The point impact estimates of VBSP and 
informal credit on income per capita are -0.04 and -0.15. However, credit from formal 
sources has positive and statistically significant impact on income per capita. An 
increase of 1 VND in per capita formal credit results in an increase of 0.2 VND in per 
capita income.  
The impact of VBSP and informal credit on expenditure per capita is positive. 
However, only informal credit has statistically significant impact. An increase of 1 
VND in per capita informal credit results in an increase of 0.05 VND in per capita 
expenditure. Impact of formal credit on expenditure per capita is very small and not 
statistically significant. 
Table 1 presents the ATT for the effect of VBSP on per capita income and per 
capita expenditure. The advantage of ATT over the regression coefficient is that it gives 
a better estimate of the total increase in per capita income and expenditure caused by 
credit. Since ATT depends on the loan size, it differs for 2004 and 2006. The impact 








                                                     
5 We tested whether VBSP credit and informal credit have a different impact in rural and urban areas by 
including interaction terms for the two types of credit and a dummy for living in an urban area. These 
estimates indicate that the effects of credit do not differ between urban and rural areas. We, therefore, 
only present the estimates for the entire sample. 
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Table 1. Impact of VBSP measured by ATT 
 
 2004   2006  
Y1 Y0 
ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
Y1 Y0 
ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
Income per capita 3715.5*** 3746.8*** -31.3 4359.1*** 4398.2*** -39.1 
 [90.6] [138.4] [99.5] [118.9] [168.3] [118.7] 
Expenditure per capita 2944.7*** 2916.9*** 27.8 3506.9*** 3472.2*** 34.7 
 [65.1] [95.9] [67.3] [97.2] [135] [87.3] 
Difference in ATT between 
income and expenditure 
  -59.1   -73.8 
  [89.5]   [114.9] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 500 
replications. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006 
 
The impact estimates of informal credit measured by ATT are presented in Table 
2. It indicates that the informal credit is quite effective in increasing expenditures but 
not income. Using the point estimates, the informal credit on average increases per 
capita expenditure by 112 and 118 thousand VND in 2004 and 2006, respectively. The 
point estimates on per capita income are negative but not statistically significant.  
Table 2. Impact of informal credit measured by ATT 
 
 2004   2006  
Y1 Y0 
ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
Y1 Y0 
ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
Income per capita 4693.1*** 5015.8*** -322.7 5491.2*** 5832.5*** -341.2 
 [103.7] [241.4] [221.2] [144.7] [273.7] [228.5] 
Expenditure per capita 3701.1*** 3589.3*** 111.8** 4279.8*** 4161.6*** 118.2** 
 [69.5] [83.8] [56.9] [100.3] [115.1] [59.3] 
Difference in ATT between 
income and expenditure 
  -434.5*   -459.5* 
  [224.4]   [231.7] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 500 
replications. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006 
 
5.2. Program impacts on poverty and inequality  
 
Table 3 and 4 presents the impact estimates of the VBSP and informal credit impact on 
expenditure poverty and inequality. The impact estimates of VBSP credit on poverty 
and inequality are negative but not statistically significant. The impact estimates of 
informal credit on poverty and inequality are also negative and quite similar to the 
impact estimates of VBSP credit. Only impact estimates of informal credit on the head 
count index are statistically significant at 10%. Informal credit helps the borrowers 
reduce the poverty incidence by around 1.6 and 1.4 percentage points in 2004 and 2006, 
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respectively. The informal credit also decreases inequality, but these effects are 
extremely small and not statistically significant.  
Table 3. Impact of VBSP credit on poverty and inequality 
  2004   2006  
With credit Without 
credit 
Impact With credit Without 
credit 
Impact 
Poverty of borrowers      
P0 0.3363*** 0.3402*** -0.0038 0.3215*** 0.3330*** -0.0115 
 [0.0209] [0.0305] [0.0222] [0.0196] [0.0363] [0.0298] 
P1 0.0857*** 0.0892*** -0.0035 0.0797*** 0.0840*** -0.0044 
 [0.0069] [0.0112] [0.0087] [0.0062] [0.0131] [0.0112] 
P2 0.0310*** 0.0327*** -0.0017 0.0270*** 0.0291*** -0.0020 
 [0.0032] [0.0055] [0.0043] [0.0027] [0.0061] [0.0053] 
All poverty       
P0 0.1949*** 0.1952*** -0.0003 0.1597*** 0.1606*** -0.0009 
 [0.0053] [0.0054] [0.0016] [0.0051] [0.0055] [0.0023] 
P1 0.0472*** 0.0475*** -0.0003 0.0383*** 0.0386*** -0.0003 
 [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0006] [0.0017] [0.0019] [0.0009] 
P2 0.0170*** 0.0171*** -0.0001 0.0137*** 0.0139*** -0.0002 
 [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0003] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0004] 
All inequality       
Gini 0.3698*** 0.3701*** -0.0003 0.3580*** 0.3583*** -0.0003 
 [0.0040] [0.0041] [0.0006] [0.0040] [0.0041] [0.0008] 
Theil L 0.2235*** 0.2239*** -0.0004 0.2117*** 0.2122*** -0.0004 
 [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0009] [0.0049] [0.0051] [0.0011] 
Theil T 0.2407*** 0.2410*** -0.0003 0.2268*** 0.2271*** -0.0003 
 [0.0065] [0.0066] [0.0008] [0.0071] [0.0072] [0.0009] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 500 
replications. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006 
 
Table 4. Impact of informal credit on poverty and inequality 
  2004   2006  
With credit Without credit Impact With credit Without credit Impact 
Poverty of borrowers     
P0 0.2532*** 0.2688*** -0.0156* 0.1972*** 0.2102*** -0.0138* 
 [0.0127] [0.0154] [0.0092] [0.0121] [0.0151] [0.0083] 
P1 0.0574*** 0.0651*** -0.0077 0.0468*** 0.0505*** -0.0037 
 [0.0040] [0.0070] [0.0059] [0.0040] [0.0048] [0.0025] 
P2 0.0204*** 0.0332*** -0.0129 0.0170*** 0.0186*** -0.0016 
 [0.0020] [0.0429] [0.0430] [0.0018] [0.0025] [0.0017] 
All poverty       
P0 0.1949*** 0.1981*** -0.0032* 0.1597*** 0.1619*** -0.0022 
 [0.0053] [0.0056] [0.0019] [0.0051] [0.0053] [0.0015] 
P1 0.0472*** 0.0488*** -0.0016 0.0383*** 0.0389*** -0.0006 
 [0.0017] [0.0021] [0.0012] [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0004] 
P2 0.0170*** 0.0196*** -0.0026 0.0137*** 0.0140*** -0.0003 
 [0.0009] [0.0087] [0.0087] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0003] 
All inequality       
Gini 0.3698*** 0.3707*** -0.0008 0.3580*** 0.3584*** -0.0005 
 [0.0040] [0.0041] [0.0007] [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0004] 
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  2004   2006  
With credit Without credit Impact With credit Without credit Impact 
Theil L 0.2235*** 0.2243*** -0.0007 0.2117*** 0.2123*** -0.0006 
 [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0005] [0.0049] [0.0049] [0.0004] 
Theil T 0.2407*** 0.2417*** -0.0010 0.2268*** 0.2274*** -0.0006 
 [0.0065] [0.0066] [0.0009] [0.0071] [0.0071] [0.0005] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 500 
replications. 





The provision of subsidized loans without formal collateral requirement through the 
VBSP forms a cornerstone of Vietnam’s anti-poverty policy. Yet, little is known on the 
impact of these preferential loans, as most evaluation reports simply describe the 
implementation and outputs of the program. In this paper, we take a completely 
different approach and use fixed-effect regression to estimate the average effect of the 
program on income and expenditures of participating households, and subsequently 
assess the impact of the program on poverty and inequality. In doing so, we intend to 
eliminate bias caused by differences between participants and non-participants in the 
VBSP.  
Like for similar impact studies before us, the reliability of our estimates may still 
be disputed. Fixed-effects regression only eliminates endogeneity bias caused by 
unobserved variables that remained unchanged between survey rounds and that have an 
additive effect on the outcome. We feel that it is reasonable to assume that the relevant 
household-level variables, such as business and production skills or motivation for 
higher income, were time-invariant during the two periods covered in this study. Fixed-
effect regressions will, however, fail to eliminate all endogeneity bias if the unobserved 
variables affect not only the level of the output but also its growth rate. Similarly, 
depending on unobserved characteristics, some households may be better able to benefit 
from new opportunities arising between survey rounds than other households are. We 
are however confident that the estimation bias resulting from these factors is small 
relative to the bias eliminated by using fixed-effects regression.   
Our estimates indicate that the VBSP credit has very small effects on income and 
consumption of the borrowers in the short-term. The impact estimates are not 
statistically significant. Although the effect estimates on poverty and inequality are 
negative, they are very small and not statistically significant. This might be because 
both income and credit in these survey are defined for the past 12 months. Most VBSP 
micro-credit are used in production and investment, which often require long period to 
be effective in increasing income and expenditure. This result seems different from 
findings of Nguyen (2008), who found positive impacts of the VBSP program on per 
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capita income and expenditure. This can be because we use different data set and 
investigate impacts on the whole population, not only on rural population as Nguyen 
(2008). In addition, Nguyen (2008) measures the effect of the VBSP using single cross-
section data. As known, households often borrow from VBSP for long time, and the 
effect measured in Nguyen (2008) can reflect accumulated effect of the VBSP micro-
credit overtime.      
Meanwhile, although informal credit has negative and not statistically significant 
impact on per capita income, it has positive and statistically significant impact on per 
capita expenditure. As a result, informal credit helps borrowers reduce expenditure 
poverty. Due the informal credit, the poverty incidence of the borrowers was reduced by 
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Table A.1. Variables of households with and without VBSP credit 















Outcome variables      
Income per capita (thousand VND) Continuous 3715.5 6104.0 4372.1 7094.8 
  [91.6] [97.5] [121.6] [100.4] 
Expenditure per capita (thousand VND) Continuous 2944.7 4574.9 3511.5 5165.2 
  [68.8] [68.9] [102.0] [71.3] 
The poverty rate (P0) Continuous 0.3363 0.1838 0.3188 0.1466 
  [0.0208] [0.0059] [0.0208] [0.0056] 
Control variables      
Household variables      
Ratio of members younger than 16 to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.2978 0.2633 0.2928 0.2369 
  [0.0082] [0.0027] [0.0092] [0.0027] 
Ratio of members older than 60 to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.0593 0.0962 0.0592 0.0999 
  [0.0048] [0.0020] [0.0047] [0.0020] 
Household size Discrete 5.2395 4.9945 5.0383 4.8531 
  [0.1117] [0.0271] [0.0687] [0.0304] 
Ratio of members with technical degree to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.0463 0.0587 0.0528 0.0682 
  [0.0052] [0.0020] [0.0052] [0.0021] 
Ratio of members with post secondary to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.0077 0.0343 0.0124 0.0360 
  [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0021] [0.0017] 
Area of annual crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 688.5 667.2 740.9 691.6 
  [36.4] [19.6] [44.2] [20.9] 
Area of perennial crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 144.6 206.4 183.1 242.7 
  [38.4] [15.5] [26.9] [15.0] 
Forestry land per capita (m2) Continuous 432.7 175.8 375.7 200.9 
  [113.3] [21.9] [68.3] [27.5] 
Aquaculture water surface per capita (m2) Continuous 25.6 62.2 36.6 63.8 
  [7.4] [7.6] [13.6] [8.4] 
Other credit (thousand VND) Continuous 116.4 903.3 293.1 1182.9 
  [22.2] [54.5] [43.1] [97.6] 
Commune variables      
Road to village (yes = 1) Binary 0.6742 0.5971 0.7251 0.6281 
  [0.0223] [0.0099] [0.0209] [0.0098] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km) Continuous 3.7390 2.0758 3.9762 2.2117 
  [0.4263] [0.0926] [0.4525] [0.1033] 
Regional variables      
Household in Red River Delta Binary 0.1721 0.2216 0.1152 0.2243 
  [0.0176] [0.0082] [0.0149] [0.0083] 
Household in North East Binary 0.2309 0.1048 0.1984 0.1082 
  [0.0197] [0.0052] [0.0186] [0.0054] 
Household in North West Binary 0.0651 0.0267 0.0692 0.0287 
  [0.0111] [0.0026] [0.0111] [0.0028] 
Household in North Central Coast Binary 0.1734 0.1253 0.2125 0.1252 
  [0.0197] [0.0070] [0.0212] [0.0071] 
Household in South Central Coast Binary 0.1197 0.0828 0.0793 0.0850 
  [0.0148] [0.0050] [0.0115] [0.0052] 
Household in Central Highlands Binary 0.0456 0.0574 0.0854 0.0581 
  [0.0087] [0.0044] [0.0139] [0.0045] 
Household in North East South Binary 0.0559 0.1672 0.0885 0.1652 
  [0.0104] [0.0085] [0.0162] [0.0084] 
Household in Mekong River Delta Binary 0.1373 0.2142 0.1516 0.2053 
  [0.0166] [0.0081] [0.0157] [0.0079] 
Household in Living in urban areas Binary 0.1309 0.2680 0.1738 0.2749 
  [0.0151] [0.0093] [0.0174] [0.0093] 
Observations  705 8483 747 8442 
Standard errors in parentheses. 






Table A.2. Variables of households with and without informal credit 
 

















Outcome variables      
Income per capita (thousand VND) Continuous 4693.1 6246.2 5491.2 7165.7 
  [114.9] [105.9] [147.6] [105.7] 
Expenditure per capita (thousand VND) Continuous 3701.1 4649.2 4279.8 5190.7 
  [78.0] [74.4] [107.8] [73.7] 
The poverty rate (P0) Continuous 0.2532 0.1800 0.1972 0.1523 
  [0.0125] [0.0061] [0.0131] [0.0060] 
Control variables      
Household variables      
Ratio of members younger than 16 to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.2970 0.2579 0.2735 0.2347 
  [0.0058] [0.0028] [0.0062] [0.0027] 
Ratio of members older than 60 to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.0748 0.0983 0.0670 0.1027 
  [0.0035] [0.0021] [0.0037] [0.0021] 
Household size Discrete 5.0194 5.0105 4.8786 4.8650 
  [0.0593] [0.0294] [0.0551] [0.0321] 
Ratio of members with technical degree to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.0568 0.0581 0.0636 0.0677 
  [0.0037] [0.0020] [0.0048] [0.0021] 
Ratio of members with post secondary to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.0150 0.0368 0.0183 0.0374 
  [0.0020] [0.0019] [0.0024] [0.0018] 
Area of annual crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 573.9 692.9 627.6 708.9 
  [31.0] [20.7] [35.6] [21.8] 
Area of perennial crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 183.2 206.7 221.7 241.5 
  [27.8] [15.6] [24.2] [15.4] 
Forestry land per capita (m2) Continuous 170.4 200.6 175.9 221.8 
  [36.3] [25.6] [32.4] [30.5] 
Aquaculture water surface per capita (m2) Continuous 27.6 67.6 43.0 65.4 
  [5.2] [8.7] [13.9] [9.0] 
Other credit (thousand VND) Continuous 633.6 900.2 655.9 1207.0 
  [96.9] [57.6] [83.7] [106.7] 
Commune variables      
Road to village (yes = 1) Binary 0.6735 0.5846 0.7090 0.6208 
  [0.0151] [0.0103] [0.0157] [0.0101] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km) Continuous 2.3459 2.1588 2.7613 2.2634 
  [0.1534] [0.1049] [0.2761] [0.1091] 
Regional variables      
Household in Red River Delta Binary 0.2606 0.2071 0.2437 0.2105 
  [0.0138] [0.0082] [0.0145] [0.0082] 
Household in North East Binary 0.1172 0.1132 0.1340 0.1113 
  [0.0092] [0.0057] [0.0108] [0.0056] 
Household in North West Binary 0.0244 0.0308 0.0302 0.0321 
  [0.0040] [0.0030] [0.0056] [0.0031] 
Household in North Central Coast Binary 0.1536 0.1225 0.1513 0.1280 
  [0.0132] [0.0070] [0.0134] [0.0073] 
Household in South Central Coast Binary 0.0650 0.0907 0.0579 0.0899 
  [0.0073] [0.0056] [0.0075] [0.0055] 
Household in Central Highlands Binary 0.0772 0.0512 0.0885 0.0545 
  [0.0089] [0.0042] [0.0101] [0.0044] 
Household in North East South Binary 0.1400 0.1640 0.1370 0.1638 
  [0.0129] [0.0087] [0.0133] [0.0086] 
Household in Mekong River Delta Binary 0.1620 0.2205 0.1574 0.2099 
  [0.0111] [0.0084] [0.0117] [0.0081] 
Household in Living in urban areas Binary 0.2138 0.2693 0.1999 0.2806 
  [0.0137] [0.0096] [0.0139] [0.0095] 
Observations  1791 7397 1473 7716 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004-2006. 































VBSP credit (thousand VND) -0.401** 0.047 -0.02 -0.280* -0.001 -0.041 
 [0.170] [0.192] [0.148] [0.156] [0.185] [0.132] 
Informal credit (thousand VND) -0.071** -0.297*** -0.250* -0.006 -0.188*** -0.153 
 [0.028] [0.032] [0.150] [0.025] [0.031] [0.100] 
Ratio of members younger than 
16 to total household members 
   -1332.275*** 348.26 1175.09 
   [335.205] [656.639] [1113.231] 
Ratio of members older than 60 
to total household members 
   -1576.37*** -1416.74** -1201.93 
   [289.439] [713.976] [967.652] 
Household size    -806.90*** -1208.37*** -1277.04*** 
    [122.663] [219.023] [370.091] 
Household size squared    37.445*** 64.983*** 72.059*** 
    [10.921] [19.022] [27.083] 
Ratio of members with technical 
degree to total household 
members 
   5589.02*** 2708.20*** 2958.45*** 
   [376.165] [566.345] [763.572] 
Ratio of members with post 
secondary to total household 
members 
   11913.96*** 4036.41*** 4654.64** 
   [548.693] [1044.384] [1985.389] 
Area of annual crop land per 
capita (m2) 
   0.503*** 0.541*** 0.563*** 
   [0.038] [0.066] [0.128] 
Area of perennial crop land per 
capita (m2) 
   0.390*** -0.052 -0.118 
   [0.046] [0.070] [0.182] 
Forestry land per capita (m2)    0.032 0.024 0.022 
    [0.025] [0.038] [0.065] 
Area of aquaculture water 
surface per capita (m2) 
   0.621*** 0.347*** 0.338*** 
   [0.095] [0.131] [0.130] 
Other credit (thousand VND)    0.270*** 0.183*** 0.195*** 
    [0.010] [0.013] [0.062] 
Road to village (yes = 1)    387.36** 477.96** 649.75*** 
    [169.569] [221.82] [224.97] 
Distance to nearest daily market 
(km) 
   -28.96*** -10.475 -10.112 
   [9.715] [12.329] [6.222] 
Red River Delta       
       
North East    -641.71***   
    [234.570]   
North West    -2176.06***   
    [364.483]   
North Central Coast    -1076.24***   
    [247.722]   
South Central Coast    -508.07*   
    [265.668]   
Central Highlands    -1167.07***   
    [324.287]   
North East South    1440.15***   
    [250.048]   
Mekong River Delta    34.445   
    [219.051]   
Urban    2408.02***   
    [222.285]   
Time effect (2006 variable) 1278.88*** 1,268.14*** 1,231.91*** 970.66*** 1084.50*** 1048.73*** 
 [84.92] [83.95] [102.96] [82.755] [83.735] [114.820] 
Constant 5808.78*** 5,854.03*** 6,174.24*** 7107.26*** 8658.64*** 8754.82*** 
 [95.09] [61.43] [70.88] [396.196] [639.718] [1271.401] 
Observations 8432 8432 8432 8432 8432 8432 
Number of i 4216 4216 4216 4216 4216 4216 
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.32 0.16 0.15 
Hausman test χ2 (prob)  201.6(0.000)   159.2(0.000)  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from panel data VHLSSs 2004-2006. 
 





























VBSP credit (thousand VND) -0.045 0.159* 0.107 -0.046 0.086 0.036 
 [0.085] [0.093] [0.102] [0.080] [0.091] [0.095] 
Informal credit (thousand VND) 0.073*** 0.045*** 0.041 0.072*** 0.053*** 0.048** 
 [0.014] [0.015] [0.025] [0.013] [0.016] [0.024] 
Ratio of members younger than 
16 to total household members 
   -1649.79*** -537.467* -429.962 
   [178.755] [324.129] [350.014] 
Ratio of members older than 60 
to total household members 
   -828.979*** -848.395** -767.033 
   [155.768] [352.431] [674.304] 
Household size    -632.301*** -984.302*** -1143.423*** 
    [65.091] [108.114] [169.066] 
Household size squared    30.182*** 51.914*** 65.632*** 
    [5.788] [9.390] [15.154] 
Ratio of members with technical 
degree to total household 
members 
   3196.43*** 923.764*** 945.558** 
   [196.832] [279.558] [419.991] 
Ratio of members with post 
secondary to total household 
members 
   8390.74*** 1550.06*** 1568.71 
   [292.248] [515.527] [1059.221] 
Area of annual crop land per 
capita (m2) 
   0.098*** 0.097*** 0.088*** 
   [0.020] [0.033] [0.026] 
Area of perennial crop land per 
capita (m2) 
   0.142*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 
   [0.024] [0.034] [0.035] 
Forestry land per capita (m2)    -0.008 -0.027 -0.033*** 
    [0.013] [0.019] [0.010] 
Area of aquaculture water 
surface per capita (m2) 
   0.127*** 0.008 0.01 
   [0.049] [0.065] [0.065] 
Other credit (thousand VND)    0.035*** 0.016** 0.016 
    [0.005] [0.006] [0.010] 
Road to village (yes = 1)    39.041 9.776 86.264 
    [87.570] [109.494] [131.785] 
Distance to nearest daily market 
(km) 
   -11.164** -2.471 -3.638 
   [4.999] [6.086] [3.215] 
Red River Delta       
       
North East    -693.759***   
    [128.506]   
North West    -1184.547***   
    [199.361]   
North Central Coast    -678.43***   
    [135.917]   
South Central Coast    -126.727   
    [145.769]   
Central Highlands    -595.504***   
    [177.455]   
North East South    1238.25***   
    [137.073]   
Mekong River Delta    123.716   
    [119.813]   
Urban    2221.648***   
    [118.748]   
Time effect (2006 variable) 627.071*** 621.833*** 617.212*** 468.800*** 533.039*** 520.804*** 
 [40.779] [40.692] [52.756] [41.045] [41.333] [56.646] 
Constant 4,296.560*** 4,292.421*** 4,553.957*** 5905.78*** 7492.23*** 8050.05*** 
 [54.577] [29.779] [28.586] [210.578] [315.777] [457.584] 
Observations 8432 8432 8432 8432 8432 8432 
Number of i 4216 4216 4216 4216 4216 4216 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.41 0.15 0.15 
  43.7(0.000)  316.0(0.000)   
Standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from panel data VHLSSs 2004-2006. 
 
